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THE WEB AS ONTOLOGY: WEB ARCHITECTURE BETWEEN 
REST, RESOURCES, AND RULES
ALEXANDRE MONNIN
1. Introduction
Few researchers have dared to theorize the basics of the Web. Those 
who did characteristically borrowed concepts from their favorite phi-
losophers or philosophical schools. Interestingly, one can illustrate this 
trend from both sides of the spectrum, from deconstructionism to ana-
lytic philosophy. According to one of the most well-known hypertext 
theorists, Georges Landow (see Delany and Landow 1991; Landow 1991, 
1994, 1997, 2006), hypertexts—the Web being assimilated to one of 
them—enact what was first described by “deconstruction” and French 
theory from the 1960s (Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and so on). 
As both these theories and hypertexts “converge,” the technical artifact 
somehow becomes the striking incarnation of a set of preexisting concepts 
that deeply redefined the roles of the author and the reader, writing, 
textuality, and so forth.
In a distant philosophical universe, Nigel Shadbolt (2007), professor of 
artificial intelligence (AI) at the University of Southampton and an open 
data advocate, adopts a very similar stance while taking inspiration from 
a different—even antagonistic—tradition: namely, the analytic one. 
According to Shadbolt, the endeavor that motivated the works of philoso-
phers such as Frege, Wittgenstein (the “early” one), Russell, and the 
Vienna Circle—undisputedly the fathers of the analytic tradition—was to 
shed light on the very notion of meaning. Their collective endeavor is 
broadly taken to have led to the definition of meaning used within the 
field of computing. In this narrative, the Semantic Web is the latest and 
most grandiose episode in a long tradition that goes back to Aristotle, 
matured in AI, and finds its apex with the Semantic Web. Rooted in a 
solid realistic view of objects, it purports to represent their intrinsic quali-
ties in the vocabularies composing them and their properties and consist-
ing of terms whose meanings correspond to objective divisions of reality.
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Finally, other authors have explicitly tried to analyze the new digital 
reality (so-called cyberspace) from an ontological perspective. David 
Koepsell in particular, opposing the extravagant claims regarding the 
fundamentally different metaphysical status of the digital realm, under-
takes to reassess the mundane character of “retrieving” a Web page:
Web pages are just another form of software. Again, they consist of data in 
the form of bits which reside on some storage medium. Just as with my word 
processor, my web page resides in a specific place and occupies a certain space 
on a hard drvie [sic] in Amherst, New York. When you “point” your browser 
to http://wings.buffalo.edu/∼koepsell, you are sending a message across the 
Internet which instructs my web page’s host computer (a Unix machine at the 
university of Buffalo) to send a copy of the contents of my personal directory, 
specifically, a HTML file called “index.html,” to your computer. That file is 
copied into your computer’s memory and “viewed” by your browser. The 
version you view disappears from your computer’s memory when you no 
longer view it, or if cached, when your cache is cleaned. You may also choose 
to save my web page to your hard drive in which case you will have a copy of 
my index.html file. My index.html file remains, throughout the browsing and 
afterward, intact and fixed. (Koepsell 2003, 126–27)
All (or so it seems) the bits and pieces, the concrete inner workings 
that make up the plumbing behind such a simple action, are analyzed 
against a backdrop of available notions and thus made all the less 
mysterious.
Yet each of the three previous cases suffers from a common mistake. 
By taking for granted without any justification some concepts, they 
commit what Brian Cantwell Smith called an “inscription error,” thus 
designating the ontological presuppositions superimposed on a given 
domain (i.e., the Web). Is the Web a hypertext? There are very good 
reasons to doubt that it is. Is it simply the continuation of the inquiry 
pursued by analytic philosophy and AI on the nature of meaning? 
Again, if there is an ontological issue to be raised, it might not be first 
and foremost with regard to computer ontologies. Finally, though 
Koepsell’s scenario certainly rings a bell with any Web user, in fact, 
what it describes, what we might call the default view of the Web, is 
by and large wrong.
Furthermore, behind the aforementioned inscription error lies a ten-
dency to forget the true character of technical systems and objects. While 
it is extremely tempting to think of the Web as the realization of preexist-
ing concepts, and the new digital environment as one that gives new 
technical flesh to venerable ideas, this view entirely misses the point of 
what it is to be a technical artifact: more than a mere speculum in which 
philosophical ideas get reflected. To borrow an expression from Antoine 
Hennion and Bruno Latour (1993), such a view betrays the signature of 
“antifetishism,” with the risk of simply losing sight of the objects.
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In order to avoid both inscription errors and antifetishism, it was 
decided to stick to two principles. The first comes from Smith (1998), who 
calls it the “principle of irreduction”—with a clear nod to Bruno Latour. 
According to this principle, no concept or presupposition should a priori 
be given preeminence. Our second viaticum comes from none other than 
Latour himself. It consists in following the actors themselves, so as to be 
able to map out their “experimental metaphysics.” Interestingly, very few 
researchers have deigned to take into account the work of dozens of Web 
architects in standardization bodies like the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) or the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) before devising 
their own theories; even fewer have always avoided the danger of substi-
tuting preexisting concepts for the reality at hand in a careful analysis of 
the Web.
2. A Tale of Two Philosophies: URIs Between Proper Names and REST
To understand the evolution of the Web from a simple project to the 
global platform we now know, one has to pay attention to the evolution 
of one of its core elements, its naming system. Only then will the portrait 
of what these names identify slowly start to emerge. Yet this is a troubled 
story going through multiple stages, from the first papers published by 
Tim Berners-Lee around 1992 on UDIs (Uniform Document Identifiers 
[Berners-Lee, Groff, and Cailliau 1992]), the drafts of the first standards 
published at IETF on URIs (Uniform Resource Identifiers; RFC 1630 
[Berners-Lee 1994]), the first real standards, published later the same year, 
after the creation of the W3C as part of the first wave of standardization 
of the Web, when URIs where sundered in URLs (conceived as addresses 
of documents; RFC 1738 [Berners-Lee, Masinter, and McCahill 1994]) 
and URNs (names of objects; RFC 1737 [Sollins and Masinter 1994]), to 
the modern understanding/implementation that revolves, once again, 
around URIs (RFC 2396 [Berners-Lee et al. 1998] and RFC 3986 [Berners-
Lee, Fielding, and Masinter 2005]).
Each of these recommendations embodies and enacts a different under-
standing of the Web. The usual story weaves the tale of a Web of docu-
ments, the height of hypertext technologies, which would eventually 
become a Web of objects, the Semantic Web or Web of Data. This is what 
prompted the so-called “Web identity crisis” (see Clark 2002, 2003a, 
2003b), a controversy that was unleashed at the turn of the century when 
people began to wonder whether it would be possible to use the Web to 
identify not only accessible “documents” but any kinds of “objects.”
2.1. The Web Identity Crisis
The most visible symptom of the crisis is without a doubt the issue called 
HTTP-Range 14 (see Berners-Lee 2002; Fielding 2005). The HTTP-Range 
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TABLE 3.1. The HTTP-Range 14 (Lewis 2007)
Code Result Indication
200 (“OK”) HTTP 
representation
Information or non-information 
resource
303 (“See other”) URI Any kind of resource
4XX/5XX Error message Impossible to infer anything about the 
nature of the resource
14 issue was an attempt to derive a technical criterion meant to distinguish 
between URIs that identify “information resources” (digital documents) 
from “non-information resources” (objects). The resolution of the issue 
was to use the code sent by a server to its client in HTTP headers to infer 
the nature of the resources identified by a URI (see table 3.1).
As is apparent from table 3.1, the technical result of the HTTP-Range 
14 issue is that it is impossible to devise such a criterion: a URI that identi-
fies Tim Berners-Lee could dereference content about him just as well as 
a URI that identifies a page about Tim Berners-Lee. Technically, there 
would be no difference. The same goes with redirection: it is not clear 
whether a URI that identifies “the Bible” and then redirects to one par-
ticular edition of the Book (such as the King James Version) would iden-
tify either a retrievable document or an abstract object in the first place. 
That is in fact why the decision that followed the HTTP-Range 14 issue 
proved to be a normative one, leading to the promotion of good practices, 
such as the 303 redirection, stating that for “inaccessible resources,” one 
should redirect to accessible resources through a 303 redirection, using a 
second URI, served by a 200 HTTP code.
The conjunction of two elements explains this decision. First, the 
information/non-information distinction is rooted in the opposition, 
found in early proposals like UDIs, between objects and documents. It 
explained why URIs were sundered into URLs and URNs as soon as the 
standardization of Web identifiers was addressed by the W3C. The other 
factor had to deal with the importance inference engines acquired in the 
context of the Semantic Web, as those were not apt to make or ignore 
distinctions between a thing and its “representation,” which are drawn 
fairly easily by human beings.
2.2. The Descriptivist Versus Rigidist Controversy
Beyond these local discussions, another reason is to be found in the 
inscription error made by the actors themselves in relation to the theories 
often associated with URIs, beyond the architecture of the Web. This 
second controversy is tightly related to the Web identity crisis. Holding 
URIs to be tantamount to philosophical proper names, it opposed an 
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updated version of Bertrand Russell’s descriptivist theory, championed by 
Patrick Hayes, and a position somehow akin to Saul Kripke’s rigid des-
ignation. But each theory led to the same pitfall.1 The extensionalist 
conception of objects drawing from model theory leaves beyond its scope 
the work of objectification that is necessary to deal with objects just as 
much as the rigidist position it opposes.
Indeed, in what seems to be the first discussion on proper names, dating 
back to 1962, Ruth Barcan Marcus’s work in analytic philosophy on 
issues of identity and modality identified proper names with meaningless 
“tags” (Marcus 1995, 32–34). Marcus imagined that those tags would be 
used to pin down objects, as in a dictionary (she later admitted that this 
was a mistake and that what she had in mind was more encyclopedia-like, 
as Kripke himself noticed (Kripke 1980, 101). As if objects were “already 
there,” just waiting for their Adam to be picked out and receive an indi-
vidual tag, so that we could use this encyclopedia to determine for every 
object its name(s) in order to assess its (necessary) identity.
Marcus herself separated this problem from that of identifying the 
aforementioned objects, which is an epistemic one. In a sense, the Seman-
tic Web, as conceived by Shadbolt, would appear to fulfill her project and 
truly “operationalize” philosophical ideas. Yet as evidenced by the lack 
of universal ontology (and without anyone taking this prospect seriously), 
the Semantic Web tends to experimentally demonstrate the contrary. 
Without this epistemic activity, there is no ontology to be found, as there 
is no means of determining what the ontological furniture of the world is. 
Only identifiers from this perspective, not objects, support relations of 
identity, after a world of “ready-made objects,” to quote Hilary Putnam 
(2005), has first been hypothesized. That’s the paradox of philosophical 
proper names, and taking them as the right tools to understand how URIs 
function although they were originally devised to answer questions of 
identity, logic, and language, whereas people on the Web are confronted 
by epistemic and ontological issues.
More generally, what is at stake here is the role of philosophy itself as 
a formal space where all the metaphysical distinctions would be already 
mapped, as in Jules Vuillemin‘s attempt (Vuillemin 2009) at formalizing 
philosophical systems (Vuillemin himself insisted on the importance of 
proper names for his perspective). Does philosophy purport to deliver 
concepts usable at any time and within any context because they exhaust 
every (logical? metaphysical?) possibility; or is it, as a discipline, capable 
of giving room to what Jacques Derrida (!) called “local thought events” 
(see Janicaud 2005, 124), thanks to which “actors themselves may locally 
change the metaphysics of the world,” following Adrian Cussins’ beautiful 
formula (Cussins 2001)?
1 This is something I explore in Monnin 2013. For another pioneering account, see Halpin 
2009.
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After all, why would concepts from the philosophy of language consti-
tute the best tool available to shed light on the problems that the architects 
of the Web are facing? Especially once these problems have been displaced 
from here to there? Not to mention the fact that there is barely any con-
sensus on the very problems philosophers are supposed to solve, without 
even mentioning those of adjacent disciplines (such as linguistics, where 
philosophy’s proper names are taken to be no more than mere artifacts 
that are nowhere to be found in ordinary language).
2.3. Back to REST
Contrary to what the focus on the Web identity crisis might indicate, 
the actual architectural style of the Web, known as REST (for Repre-
sentational State Transfer) comes up with a very different answer to the 
questions raised earlier. REST is the result of the work undertaken by 
Roy Fielding for his Ph.D. dissertation (Fielding 2000). Fielding had 
been tasked by Tim Berners-Lee to elaborate on the design philosophy 
behind HTTP and the Web. Fielding’s mission, at the time, was to under-
stand what made the Web so special, by going so far as to contrast the 
result of his investigation with the actual implementation of the Web. In 
other words, to be faithful enough to the Web to go so far as to transcend 
its implementation. That is why, in his answer to an e-mail questioning 
whether REST, which contains the principles behind the HTTP protocol, 
logically precedes it, Fielding points out that the answer to that question 
cannot rely on a merely “logical” chicken-and-egg distinction:
Question: Logically, REST really had to predate HTTP 1.1 in order for HTTP
1.1 to be so RESTful.
No?
Answer (R.T. Fielding): No. That is more of a philosophical question than a 
logical one.
HTTP/1.1 is a specific architecture that, to the extent I succeeded in applying 
REST-based design, allows people to deploy RESTful network-based applica-
tions in a mostly efficient way, within the constraints imposed by legacy imple-
mentations. The design principles certainly predated HTTP, most of them were 
already applied to the HTTP/1.0 family, and I chose which constraints to apply 
during the pre-proposal process of HTTP/1.1, yet HTTP/1.1 was finished long 
before I had the available time to write down the entire model in a form that 
other people could understand. All of my products are developed iteratively, 
so what you see as a chicken and egg problem is more like a dinosaur-to-
chicken evolution than anything so cut and dried as the conceptual form pre-
existing the form. HTTP as we know it today is just as dependent on the 
conceptual notion of REST as the definition of REST is dependent on what I 
wanted HTTP to be today. (Fielding 2006)
The W3C was created in 1994 in order to ensure the technical govern-
ance of the Web. Right after its creation, a first wave of standardization 
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was launched. Among the first standards to be written were those related 
to Web identifiers, known first as UDIs and later URIs. URIs, as already 
mentioned, were then split into URLs and URNs, each with different 
kinds of referents, the former’s being thought of as ever-changing acces-
sible documents and the latter’s as stable objects outside the Web. Yet 
this didn’t seem to work out, because people wanted to access contents 
about any kind of “object” on the Web, using HTTP instead of ad hoc 
protocols designed and maintained by URN scheme owners, such as 
library organizations, for instance. For that reason, in 1997 and 1999, 
major revisions were brought to the standards, which included the fusion 
of URLs and URNs into URIs and a new version of the HTTP protocol. 
Fielding was among other things the main editor of the HTTP 1.1 pro-
tocol, including the current 1999 version (Fielding et al. 1997, 1999), and 
URIs (in 1998 and then again in 2005), and the cocreator of the Apache 
Foundation (which designed the dominant server software on the Web). 
With REST, one can see him participating in the establishment of a 
coherent Web, from servers, to the transfer protocol between them and 
their clients, to the underlying naming system that powers the entire 
construct.
The work on REST began around 1995, at a time when the difficulties 
surrounding URLs and URNs became more obvious by the day. Fielding 
made his doctoral dissertation widely available online in 2000. He also 
published an article written with his dissertation supervisor (Fielding and 
Taylor 2002). These constitute all the primary sources available on REST 
save for a few blog posts Fielding published years later (especially Fielding 
[2008]).
REST is often seen as a method for building Web services competing 
with SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol), CORBA, Web Services, 
and other RPC protocols. Viewed thus, however, its real significance is 
completely lost. REST is more precisely described as what Latour calls 
a “re-representation” (Latour 2005, 566–67), a document whose purpose 
is to reinterpret a number of other technical documents (RFCs) and the 
artifact they describe (the HTTP protocol and URIs in particular). The 
work on REST had an immediate impact on the way standards were 
rewritten in 1997 and 1998 under Fielding’s guidance. Despite not being 
a standard, it nevertheless acted as a “meta-investment of forms,” to 
extend Laurent Thévenot’s work on the investment of forms (Thévenot 
1984) one step further, in order to make standards themselves more 
generic, stable, and interoperable (which is already the purpose of basic 
standardization). It is as much a reinterpretation of a technical reality 
that precedes it as a way to devise, discover, and/or ascribe (the frontiers 
between those terms are blurred) new distinctions that proved immensely 
useful (see Pierre Livet’s contribution in this volume and Monnin 2013, 
parts 3 and 4, for a more thorough discussion on distinguishing as an 
ontogonic activity).
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2.4. Resources as Shadows Symbolized Through Functions in REST
REST articulates a very original view of what’s “on” the Web. According 
to Berners-Lee, URIs were not addresses, unlike UNIX paths. The differ-
ence between the two is mainly explained with regard to two different 
kinds of variations that I call “synchronic” and “diachronic.”
Synchronic variations originate from functionalities, such as “content 
negotiation” (also known as “conneg”), a feature of the HTTP protocol 
that forbids taking one file stored on a server as what is being referred to 
by a URI, since the content served can vary according to the customiza-
tion of the client’s request, making it impossible to functionally relate URI 
with one file on a server (an assertion that holds from the inception of the 
Web, pace Koepsell). Furthermore, even “static” Web pages (which never 
really existed—a good example against this very idea would be the use of 
counters that changed their “pages” every time they were being accessed 
by a client) could be considered mash-ups, as they contained external 
URIs of images embedded in HTML elements, thereby distributing the 
sources from which such “pages” were generated. Such principles date 
back to 1991–1993, with System 33, a Xerox system demonstrated to Tim 
Berners-Lee by Larry Masinter at PARC in the early 1990s (Putz 1993; 
Putz, Weiser, and Demers 1993).
The other kind of variations, diachronic variations, are more widely 
acknowledged than the synchronic ones. It is well known that pages 
“evolve.” Lacking any versioning system, the Web does not self-archive 
those modifications by adding a new identifier every time they occur. Yet 
“pages” somehow remain the same. Such paradoxical duality explains why 
URIs were at some point replaced by both URLs and URNs. At the time, 
it was thought that content varied too much on the Web to allow for stable 
reference, leaving this task to URNs, though URNs were devoid of any 
access function, at least through the HTTP protocol.2 The dichotomy 
performed was a classic “on the Web”/“outside the Web” one, which was 
later abandoned thanks to REST—though this is something that still 
hasn’t always been properly assessed. Another reason has to do with the 
fact that URLs are not addresses, or should not be treated as such, oth-
erwise lots of problems arise because the local level of the database direc-
tories when it reflects the way URLs are written and constantly rewritten 
is no longer distinguished from the global level exposed to users, where 
stability is paramount; a necessity that is made clear through modules such 
as “URL rewriting” in Apache servers that help to manage both levels.
The solution advocated in REST (in a nutshell, without exhausting 
REST’s significance for the Web) is a very elegant one. It states that 
instead of files, documents, objects, and so forth, what is being referred 
2 By default, everything on the Web will either change or disappear. Everything that has 
been published must be tended to. The idea that the so-called Web 1.0 was a Web of long-
lasting, not-dynamic documents is by and large a phantasy.
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to by a URI is a “resource.” Here’s the definition given in REST (by 
Fielding and Taylor): “A resource R is a temporally varying membership 
function MR(t), which for time t maps to a set of entities, or values, which 
are equivalent. The values in the set may be resource representations and/
or resource identifiers. A resource can map to the empty set, which allows 
references to be made to a concept before any realization of that concept 
exists—notion that was foreign to most hypertext systems prior to the 
Web” (Fielding and Taylor 2002, 125).
Resources are compared to concepts or even “shadows” insofar they 
are not material, unlike “representations,” those encoded messages that 
are served when a URI is dereferenced. Whence the paradox, central to 
the Web and its architecture, described by Fielding and Taylor in a para-
graph judiciously entitled “Manipulating Shadows”:
7.1.2 Manipulating Shadows. Defining resource such that a URI identifies a 
concept rather than a document leaves us with another question: how does a 
user access, manipulate, or transfer a concept such that they can get something 
useful when a hypertext link is selected? REST answers that question by defin-
ing the things that are manipulated to be representations of the identified 
resource, rather than the resource itself. An origin server maintains a mapping 
from resource identifiers to the set of representations corresponding to each 
resource. A resource is therefore manipulated by transferring representations 
through the generic interface defined by the resource identifier. (Fielding and 
Taylor 2002, 135)
One interesting consequence of this paradox is that unlike other infor-
mation systems, where pointers are for instance linked to memory 
addresses, resources are truly abstract. Hence, what is digital, the rep-
resentation, is also material (as in “not virtual”). If there is anything 
virtual, in the philosophical sense of the word, as opposed to actual, as 
Deleuze reminded us, then it is not digital. In addition, we come to 
understand, thanks to REST, that the issue at stake is not so much 
“what there is on the Web” but rather “what there is,” a question that 
is asked anew thanks to the Web.3
3. From References to Referentialization
3.1. Resources as Rules
In order to address these difficulties, one should decide against favor-
ing philosophical concepts, such as proper names (understood as an 
explanans) to shed some light on those that were now stabilized in the 
3 Among other things, there are digital objects that have specific properties, being non-
rivalrous goods, for instance (see Hui and Vafopoulos in this volume). Though ontologically 
challenging in their own way, they still differ from resources. A thorough analysis of the 
Web must account for both the latter and their representations.
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current state of the architecture of the Web (resources, URIs, HTTP 
representations, etc.). We have already paid twice for the concepts we 
received from the actors we were studying: first by refusing to follow 
them when they appealed to the philosophy of language, then by fol-
lowing what they had “practically” done.
There is yet another distinction that calls for an explanation in REST: 
the idea that resources can be further articulated by states and representa-
tions of these states (whence the acronym REST itself: what is Transferred 
on the Web is a REpresentational State of a resource). We thus end up 
with three constitutive elements: the resource identified by the URI, the 
state entered at a given time, and the concrete, accessible representation 
of that state. I would like to argue that this threefold distinction leads to 
a comparison with Wittgenstein’s concept of a rule, the resource being the 
equivalent of the rule; the state the result of rule following; and the rep-
resentation a symbolic (or technical) representation of the latter.
The concept of a rule sheds light on a central difficulty for Web archi-
tecture. REST indeed specifies that a resource is always abstract, as 
opposed to its representations. Nevertheless, to argue that my resource is 
a chair requires associating the physical properties of a chair with the 
abstract properties that Web architecture attributes to the resource. As in 
Edward Zalta’s (2003) take on fictional entities—whose relation to rules 
is more obvious than chairs!—where some properties are either encoded 
(being named Sherlock Holmes, having a brother named Mycroft, and so 
forth) or exemplified (initially being a creation of Conan Doyle, appearing 
in such and such novellas, etc.) by the fictional objects. The abstract char-
acter of resources is both upheld and denied in URI standards, especially 
in the RFC 2396, for instance. Far from being anecdotal, this betokens 
how difficult it is to overcome the received conception of objects as physi-
cal entities. It is directly from such a conception that seemingly stems the 
need to sunder resources into “information” and “non-information” ones, 
from UDIs to HTTP-Range 14 (though not REST!).
If we want to get rid of those paradoxes, we’ll have to forge a con-
ception of objects at least as subtle as what is hinted at with the concept 
of a resource.
3.2. Referentialization Instead of Reference
Up to now, the distinctions drawn from the architecture of the Web have 
been discussed in relation to the positions of three philosophers: Russell, 
Wittgenstein, and Kripke. According to this view, to understand the archi-
tecture of the Web one need only choose one position among the three. 
The problem with this view is that it deprives Web architecture of its au-
tochthonous technical background, distinctions, and mediators; in other 
words, of its specificity being thus reduced to no more than an “intermedi-
ary” in Latour’s sense, in other words the mere projection of conceptions 
drawn from the philosophy of language.
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4 The arrow indicates a coupling, typical of processes, between the actual and the virtual; 
the characters between the parentheses refer to the aspect that is being replaced; the part in 
italics, to the aspect that will replace the latter; in bold, the process that is qualified; the 
superscript the initial (1) or final (2) aspect of a process; the subscript, whether it’s process 
number 1 or 2; V stands for virtual, A for actual.
FIGURE 3.1. Referentialization of the Web.
FIGURE 3.2. A process view on dereferentialization.
The work of Pierre Livet and Frédéric Nef (2009) on “social beings” 
(more aptly described as an attempt to “ontologize” Wittgenstein’s 
concept of a rule) proved helpful in making sense of the architecture 
of the Web itself. Their “ontology of process” allows us to articulate 
resources and their representations according to their respective virtual 
and actual dimensions (the abstract resource having to do with the 
virtual, and its concrete representation with the actual—meaning that 
digital beings belong to the actual, the effective; in other words: not to 
the virtual).
In a nutshell, this analysis leads to a model where two processes con-
verge, a qualifying process and a qualified one, as depicted in figure 3.1.
Translated into Livet and Nef’s formalism,4 the model takes the fol-
lowing form (depicted in figure 3.2):
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URI A1
1
2
1→ ( )Re V Rep A12
Rep A2
2
1
2→ Dref V
As in a promise, in the example Livet and Nef use to illustrate their 
analysis, the virtual dimension weighs on an actual process and qualifies 
it (qualifying an action as the fulfilling of a promise, just as a resource 
qualifies a representation as belonging to one virtual trajectory instead of 
another). Two HTTP representations might indeed look identical from an 
actual perspective and differ with regard to their respective trajectories.
Take this canonical example of Web architecture (Jacobs and Walsh 
2004): a daily report of the weather in Oaxaca, Mexico. If one derefer-
ences the URI that identifies this resource on August 1, 2004, the report 
generated will naturally provide information about the weather in Oaxaca 
on August 1, 2004. Yet one would be wrong to infer from this repre-
sentation that it represents the weather of Oaxaca on August 1, 2004, 
and then straightforwardly use this URI to bookmark such a resource. 
Indeed, there might even be an archived URI that identifies a second 
resource: “the weather in Oaxaca, Mexico, on August 1, 2004.” Although 
both resources may spawn identical representations when their paths 
cross at a given time, they will remain different insofar as we keep in 
mind the heterogeneous virtual trajectories that they draw and into which, 
consequently, their representations are inserted: the first will change on 
a daily basis, while the second typically should remain stable over time 
(on the Web, remaining stable is never a given; it always costs a lot).
Instead of the traditional notion of reference, the gap between words 
and the world, words and things, signs and objects, we’re led to understand 
the basic relation between URIs and resources and their representations 
as a technical (and editorial) relationship of referentialization as displayed 
above, a relation where various mediators (servers, browsers, URIs, algo-
rithms, standards, and so on) play a role that is simply impossible to 
conceive from the traditional perspective of the philosophy of language.
It belongs to a philosophy of (the architecture of) the Web to measure 
the discrepancy between itself and the tradition. The very practice of 
“philosophical engineering,” a phrase coined by Tim Berners-Lee (2003) 
to designate the activity of Web architects, produces new distinctions and 
new entities without necessarily keeping to them, sometimes even burying 
their specificity behind received philosophical positions, whereas to remain 
faithful to philosophical engineering, one has to go so far as to critically 
examine the philosophies under which it is buried by the actors themselves. 
To summarize, philosophy is no longer treated as the explanans (the rela-
tion of reference that is studied by the philosophy of language) with regard 
to an explanandum (referentialization as a working, though largely 
modified, relation of reference; i.e., full of mediators, standards, shadows, 
and so forth).
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3.3. The Object as a Rule
Philosophical engineering can be understood as the result of an ontogonic 
activity through which new beings emerge. At the center of Web architec-
ture, the very notion of a resource explains the distinctions drawn in 
philosophical engineering by adding a level of indirection between the 
identifier and the tangible, actual, representations accessible on the Web. 
Instead of a dualistic picture, torn apart between identifiers understood 
as tags attached to ready-made, extensional objects, what is drawn in 
REST is a completely renewed picture of objects conceived as rules of 
individuation, reminiscent of Roy Fielding’s definition of the resource as 
being “the semantics of what an author intends to identify” (Fielding and 
Taylor 2002, 135). The very act of positing an object means becoming 
engaged to remain faithful to that same object by regularly (in both the 
normative and the temporal senses of the word) serving adequate content 
about it. In other words, the main innovation of Web architecture, surpris-
ing as it may sound, is not to be found in any concrete mediator, be it the 
server or the browser, the URI or the link, HTTP as such, and so on. It 
is an ontological innovation around which everything else revolves and 
whose mode of existence in turn can only be felt through a coordinated 
choreography of mediators.
Assimilating objects to rules points to various philosophers, including 
Kant (see de Coorebyter 1985), for whom objects were constructed with 
rules—the concepts of the understanding, a list of which is given at the 
end of the Transcendental Deduction. In 1910, Ernst Cassirer (Cassirer 
1977) extended the idea that concepts were rules through his notion of 
“serial objects,” inspired by the progress of the modern logic of his time, 
in particular the privilege given to a functionalist symbolism over sub-
stances (here, the similarity to the quote above from Fielding is striking). 
Husserl (1989) made similar remarks at exactly the same time (1910) (see 
Gérard 2005). In 1928, Carnap (2001), in his Aufbau, completed this 
rethinking of objects and the shift from Kantianism to neo-Kantianism, 
the object looking more and more like a function insofar as it became 
impossible to distinguish it from a concept. Yet, despite the “construc-
tion” metaphor so paramount in Carnap’s book, except for Cassirer and 
the late Husserl these thinkers neglected the importance of technics—a 
theoretical stance that can no longer be ours.
Here’s the paradox: once again, the most autochthonous (or “het-
erogeneous,” as Bernard Stiegler would put it in his trademark Hus-
serlian fashion) components of the Web that emerged out of philosophical 
engineering pave the way for a renewed understanding of objectifica-
tion, and thus of ontology itself. We need to understand what kind of 
referents there are on the Web. Although this is made possible through 
a careful analysis of its architecture, our investigations also lead to 
another paradox, since objects are no longer physical objects. Actually, 
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they even look very much like senses or meanings. Yet we’re not ready 
to adopt a neo-Fregean framework and abandon the focus on reference 
that seems to characterize the Web. Rather, it’s time to think afresh 
what referents are. In this respect, an examination of the best system 
of reference humankind has ever known so far is a mandatory step.
David Kaplan’s famous analysis of deictic expressions will help us to 
account for this little conundrum.5 According to Kaplan, the meaning of 
a deictic expression is akin to a function, which doesn’t vary. Kaplan 
distinguishes between the content of the indexical expression and its char-
acter. The character is a function or a “rule,” the linguistic meaning of an 
expression that associates contexts as input and contents as outputs. 
Under such an analysis, an indexical like “I” may be analyzed this way:
“I”
Character The singularizing rule of being the enunciator of the expression “I”
Content The object itself
Extension The object itself
5 Kaplan’s texts on direct reference are available in Davidson 2007.
Kaplan’s question consisted in determining whether when using deictic 
expressions they are being directly referred to or not. Despite his insist-
ence on the importance of rules, objects, on this view, remain untouched. 
Therefore, we have to move one step further. The possibility is given by 
Brian Cantwell Smith’s account of objects. Smith compares the afore-
mentioned situation, with deictic expressions and rules, to the attraction 
exercised by a magnet. Just as with the rule of the deictic, the attraction 
remains constant and systematic (governed by laws, not unlike meaning 
itself). By contrast, the objects that fall within its attraction, its “refer-
ents,” vary alongside the use of the magnet (the decisive factor being use 
more than token, says Smith). He contends that in both cases “the gov-
erning laws (regularity, habits) is an abstract but constant universal that 
maps particular occurrences—events, essentially—onto other particular 
occurrences or events, in a systematic way. . . . The crucial point of simi-
larity, which is also the most difficult to say, has to do with the fact that 
the particularity of the result, referent of collected item, spreads out 
through space and time, in a kind of continuous egocentric (differential) 
way, until it captures the first entity that relates to the source or originat-
ing particular events in the mandated fashion” (Smith 1998, 170). Such 
individual entities remain beyond the grasp of physics; they are presup-
posed but not given. Whence this radical conclusion: “In sum, being an 
individual object is also not, in and of itself, an effective or even salient 
physical property. No physical attribute holds of an individual, for 
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example, except in virtue of its physical composition. If ‘to be is to be 
the value of a bound variable,’ physics will be of no help in easing the 
existential angst of any ordinary individuals. For there are no physical 
objects” (Smith 1998, 178; see also Livet and Nef 2009, 207).
Objects are no more given hic et nunc than resources are. Even more 
so, representations share with physical particularity the ability to spread 
out through space and time once they are related either to an object or to 
a resource accounting for their virtual trajectories. Hence, the Quinean 
motto that “to be is to be the value of a bound variable” (Quine 1980) 
may handily be turned into “to be an object is to be an individuating 
function” (or rule). Throughout innumerable encounters with representa-
tions, the object forever remains absent (at least in toto) in the back-
ground. Again, not very far from the way REST accounts for resources 
as intangible shadows and also reminiscent of the philosophical meaning 
of objects. “Objective existence” has been contrasted since the seventeenth 
century with “formal existence,” what we would now call concrete 
existence, a trait Whitehead elaborated upon in the twentieth century, 
especially through his rejection of the principle of “simple location,”6 
according to which objects have a simple spatial and temporal location 
hic et nunc—a clear forerunner of our analysis if Web architecture is 
indeed an ontology.7
3.4. Frailty, Thy Name Is Resource
To impart a little more realism to this definition, one could refer to the 
work of Etienne Souriau, whose entire project, according to David Lapou-
jade, was to “save from nothingness the most frail and evanescent forms 
of existence” (Lapoujade 2011). We are balancing between two different 
worlds, to borrow a distinction made by Antoine Hennion (2007, 362): an 
“externalized world,” shared, agreed upon, comprising autonomous enti-
ties, and an “internalized world,” where nothing receives fixed properties 
or identity, where objects are constituted “by actively participating in 
constitutive operation.” I would like to hint at a diplomatic mutual under-
standing of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Actor Network Theory by 
drawing a parallel between “attachments” as described by Hennion (2004) 
and “rules.” Rules are typically in between objects and subjects, action 
7 One should immediately add that the very word “ontology” appeared at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century, following the work of the late scholastic Francisco Suarez, in the 
works of Jacobus Lorhardus and Rudolph Goclenius. Contrasting with the tradition of 
the Aristotelian metaphysics, “ontology” was newly conceived as a “theory of objects” in 
the wake of Duns Scotus’ concept of the univocity of being. My own work on the Web 
builds upon this understanding of the word “ontology” (mutatis mutandis).
6 See the analysis of Debaise (2006). Whitehead’s discussion of this principle can be found 
in his Science and the Modern World.
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and passion, freedom and determinism, and so forth. The parallel becomes 
all the more obvious when one realizes that a rule is typically what makes 
someone do something, in a very Latourian way of redefining agency, 
neither causally nor by sheer force. If resources are shadows, as much 
agent as patient of individuation, they nevertheless have their own agency, 
as befits objects—and rules! Nor are resources mere antifetishistic projec-
tions: they display a clear resistance by demanding regular coordination 
of their representations as well as to their representations—upon which 
they also depend. Not a small feat at all in the context of online 
publication.
It is easy to miss the resource and its tentative ontology, an ontology 
to be achieved rather than simply recorded. Forget good practices; 
substitute tangible mediators themselves to the reason why they are coor-
dinated; or simply shift back to the world of extensional objects, “post-
ontological objects” according to Smith (1998, 131)—and voilà! Even 
now discussions are going on inside the W3C to get rid of resources (see 
Summers 2013). Supposedly, Web developers have nothing to do with 
them—in practice; just as theoreticians stubbornly ignored them—
in theory. To save an object from nothingness out of respect is a weird 
defense against a traditional ontological backdrop. Once we’ve moved 
to a completely different picture, call it the “successor metaphysics” as 
Smith does (1998, 87) or tentative ontologies as does Hennion, and the 
paradox disappears. All one needs is to dispose oneself to be played by 
the rules.
4. Conclusion: Toward Ontological Politics
There remains the task of determining how to agree on the components 
of a shared world. The solution doesn’t come from a single person. Indeed, 
the idea to use Wikipedia to perform the function of “sorting proposi-
tions,” which Latour identified in his Politics of Nature, dates back to 
2006, with the birth of DBpedia, the central data repository of the entire 
Web of Data (as represented on the Linked Data Cloud).8 This solution 
of using an encyclopedia in order to come to an agreement about the 
ontological furniture of the world is exactly what Ruth Barcan Marcus 
had in mind with her idea of a “dictionary,” though this part of the philo-
sophical problem was of no interest to her, as only the result (objects to 
be tagged) interested her, not the way we get there—unlike Semantic Web 
practitioners.
The political dimension of this ontological achievement should not be 
lost on us. Indeed, to produce an ontological device on a global scale 
8 Cf. http://lod-cloud.net/. See Auer et al. 2007.
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cannot remain outside politics, because objects thereby acquire a political 
dimension, as pointed out by Noortje Marres:
Like other forms of politics, we then say, the politics of objects is best 
approached as a performative politics. For no entity, whether human or non-
human, institution or things, it suffices to posit on theoretical grounds that they 
“have” political capacities. For all entities, agential capacities depend at least 
in part on how these entities are equipped—on the configuration of an assem-
blage of entities that enable the explication of their normative capacities. This 
is why, somewhat paradoxically, in order to grasp the politics of objects, we 
must pay attention not just to objects, but also to the technologies and settings 
which enable them to operate. We must investigate how particular devices 
make possible the investment of things with political capacities. (Marres 2012, 
104–5)
The Web, from the point of view of its architecture, certainly serves as a 
prime example of a device that “makes possible the investment of things 
with political capacities.” Still, a lot remains to be done in order to 
improve the way objects and people are represented—in the political sense 
of the word; how the pluriverse, the many ways things both individuate 
themselves and are individuated, finds its adequate expression and related 
controversies made more visible. The latter could be achieved by making 
more “epistemic data” available on DBpedia regarding the state of the 
objectification on Wikipedia: the nature of the sources used to draw the 
portrait of an object (those who produce the primary sources quotable 
on Wikipedia in fact determine the nature of the “porte-paroles”—
“experiments,” “facts,” “numbers,” and so forth; others can mobilize to 
single out an object), the history of the articles, the discussions and con-
troversies that they sometimes generate, and so forth.9 As of now, these 
data are lost on us on DBpedia, as if no epistemic properties were involved 
in discriminating objects. We saw precisely the contrary.
The current philosophy of the Web, its architecture, appears not only 
as prosthesis for objectification. As is made obvious in the parallel with 
Brian Cantwell Smith’s philosophy of objects, it is possible to think about 
it as a genuine philosophical position, despite its not being written in a 
book. We’re no longer projecting philosophical concepts; rather, we came 
to recognize how the distributed agencies—rather than the actions—of 
“objects” (shadowy resources), “subjects” (publishers, Web architects, 
and so on), and mediators (standards, servers, protocols, languages, etc.) 
as much hold the Web as they hold thanks to the Web. Then, by extending 
9 The author is the co-initiator of the French version of DBPedia, available online at 
http://dbpedia.org and as part of the SemanticPedia project (http://www.semanticpedia.
org/), a platform for the publication of the Wikimedia projects in French in conformity with 
Linked Data guidelines. This project presents an upgraded version of DBpedia, where the 
page history of each article is semanticized, and aims at keeping track of discussions as well 
both encouraging and fostering controversy analysis on Wikipedia.
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the architecture of the Web, its operative philosophy or ontology, to 
Wikipedia (and DBpedia) understood as the institution where resources 
undergo various trials (what Joëlle Zask [2004] calls a process of “inter-
objectification” in reference to John Dewey), we see how the Web per-
forms something that would no longer qualify simply as an ontology 
(focusing on the nature objects qua objects) but as both a political ontology 
and an ontological democracy where everyone participates in determining 
and “making happen” what there is.
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